top ten list 2013

ok, so it’s not really ten posts but a baker’s dozen — and it’s not even thirteen posts but thirteen “themes” — so sue me! (^_^)

this “top ten” list was determined solely by me. ymmv.

clannishness – difficult to define, but i know it when i see it:
clannishness defined
where do clans come from?
where do emmanuel todd’s family types come from?
mating patterns, family types, social structures, and selection pressures

individualism-collectivism – a curious paradox?:
national individualism-collectivism scores
kandahar vs. levittown
universalism vs. particularism
universalism vs. particularism again

what a few hundred years of outbreeding might get you?:
archaic greek mating patterns and kinship terms

what a moderate amount of outbreeding (making you an in-betweener) might get you?:
the radical reformation

inbreeding, outbreeding, and democracy:
questions some of us thought to ask

inbreeding, outbreeding, and violence:
kinship, the state, and violence

why inbreeding or outbreeding?:
flatlanders vs. mountaineers revisited
consanguineous marriage in afghanistan
mating patterns in france and topography (and history)
the turkana: mating patterns, family types, and social structures
guess the population!

medieval germanic kindreds:
medieval germanic kindreds…and the ditmarsians
more on medieval germanic kindreds

the north sea populations – the anglo-saxons and the dutch:
the anglo-saxons and america 3.0
the saxons, the anglo-saxons, and america 3.0
the importance of the kindred in anglo-saxon society
the transition from shame to guilt in anglo-saxon england (and “core” europe)
going dutch
“core europe” and human accomplishment

the quakers:
random notes: 07/30/13
the myddle people
geographical origin of the quakers
on the topographical origins of the quakers
quaker individualism

the irish:
what’s this all about?
early and late medieval irish mating practices
clannish medieval ireland
early modern and modern clannish ireland
mating patterns, family types, and clannishness in twentieth century ireland

the arabs:
historic mating patterns on the arabian peninsula
hejazis vs. najdis (and vice versa)

on (political) witch-hunts and the nature of witch-hunting:
“to disbelieve in witchcraft is the greatest of heresies”
a loaded question
why human biodiversity is true…and why jason richwine is right
something’s rotten in the state of denmark

– this was also the year of the hbd chick interview @the hoover hog! thanks, chip! (^_^)

– and the year that i got my very own (awesome!) Heroes of the Dark Enlightenment trading card from Radish Magazine!! awww, shucks. (*^_^*)

hbd chick trading card

– and, finally, it was also the year that i asked: where are my DRAGONS?! (^_^)

where do emmanuel todd’s family types come from?

from long-term mating patterns. there. i said it! (~_^)

just to remind everybody — emmanuel todd is a french historian/anthropologist/demographer/sociologist/political scientist who, amongst other things, has (more or less correctly, imho) noticed a connection between family types (nuclear, extended, clan, etc.) and ideology (capitalism, communism, christianity, islam, etc.). see his The Explanation of Ideology: Family Structures and Social Systems (and my previous post “l’explication de l’idéologie”).

here is a summary of todd’s family types, where he found them, and some of their fundamental characteristics and related ideologies (again, see previous post for more — see also this chart from craig willy):

absolute nuclear family
– no cohabitation of married children with their parents
– no marriage between the children of brothers
– anglo-saxons, netherlands, denmark
– christianity, capitalism, ‘libertarian’ liberalism, feminism

egalitarian nuclear family
– no cohabitation of married children with their parents
– no marriage between the children of brothers.
– northern france, northern italy, central and southern spain, central portugal, greece, romania, poland, latin america, ethiopia
– christianity (catholicism); the “liberte, egalite, fraternite” form of liberalism

authoritarian family
– cohabitation of the married heir with this parents
– little or no marriage between the children of two brothers
– germany, austria, sweden, norway, belgium, bohemia, scotland, ireland, peripheral regions of france, northern spain, northern portugal, japan, korea, jews, romany gypsies
– socialism/bureaucratic socialism or social democracy, catholicism. fascism sometimes, various separatist and autonomous (anti-universalist) movements (think german federalism)

exogamous community family
– cohabitation of married sons and their parents
– no marriage between the children of two brothers
– russia, yugoslavia, slovakia, bulgaria, hungary, finland, albania, central italy, china, vietnam, cuba, north india (note that many of these countries, the eastern european ones, also have a tradition of marrying young)
– communism

endogamous community family
– cohabitation of married sons with their parents
– frequent marriage between the children of brothers
– arab world, turkey, iran, afghanistan, pakistan, azerbaijan, turkmenistan, uzbekistan, tadzhikistan
– islam

asymmetrical community family
– cohabitation of married sons and their parents
– prohibition on marriages between the children of brothers, but a preference for marriages between the children of brothers and sisters
– southern India
– hinduism; a variety of communism unlike that found elsewhere

anomic family
– cohabitation of married children with their parents rejected in theory but accepted in practice
– consanguine marriage possible and sometimes frequent
– burma, cambodia, laos, thailand, malaysia, indonesia, philippines, madagascar, south-american indian cultures

african systems
– instability of the household
– polygyny

the fundamental pattern here is that the family types run from small (and individualistic) to large (and communal) — from nuclear families through to community families. the underlying fundamental pattern — the causal factor — is that the long-term mating patterns run from outbreeding to greater and greater levels of inbreeding (to inbreeding+polygamy in many african societies).

as i said in a previous post where do clans come from?:

“the presence (or absence) of clans in societies is somehow connected to the mating patterns of societies. in fact, it seems to be that a whole range of kinship-based societal types is somehow connected to a whole range of mating patterns: the ‘closer’ the mating patterns in a society, the more ‘clannish’ it tends to be — the more distant the mating patterns, the less ‘clannish.’

“so we see a spectrum of ‘clannish’ societies ranging from the very individualistic western societies characterized by nuclear families and, crucially, very little inbreeding (cousin marriage, for instance) to very tribal arab or bedouin societies characterized by nested networks of extended families and clans and large tribal organizations and having *very high* levels of inbreeding (specifically a form of very close cousin marriage which increases the degree of inbreeding). falling somewhere in between these two extremes are groups like the chinese whose society is built mostly around the extended familiy but in some regions of china also clans — or the medieval scots (especially the highland scots) whose society for centuries was built around the clan (h*ck, they even coined the term!). these ‘in-betweener’ groups are, or were, characterized by mid-levels of inbreeding (typically avoiding the very close cousin marriage form of the arabs).”

running through todd’s types:

– the absolute nuclear family found in anglo-saxons (the english), the netherlands, and denmark. todd notes that there is no marriage between the children of brothers in societies where this family type is found. in fact, there has been very little cousin marriage of ANY sort in these “core european” societies since the middle ages (see “mating patterns in europe series” below ↓ in left-hand column) — especially in (southern) england and (parts of) the netherlands (i don’t know about denmark). these are the areas of northwest europe — of probably the world — that have been outbreeding the most, since the early part of the medieval period — and they have the smallest families and are the greatest individualists (although i’m not so sure about the danes…).

– the egalitarian nuclear family found in northern france, northern italy, central and southern spain, central portugal, greece, romania, poland, latin america, and ethiopia. again, todd notes there there is no marriage between the children of brothers in these societies, but the key — at least as far as the european societies here go — is that they, too, have mostly been avoiding ALL forms of cousin marriage for a very long time — but NOT QUITE as long, or for as much, as the peoples of the low countries/southern england. The Outbreeding Project of the europeans (as i like to call it) really got going earliest amongst the franks (and the anglo-saxons in kent who had close ties to the franks), and it spread out in all directions across europe from there. so, the populations closest to the early medieval frankish heartland (other parts of northern france, northern italy, spain, portugal) are just one family type step away from the absolute nuclear family — and individualistic, but not as individualistic as the english or dutch. (for more details on these other european countries see “mating patterns in europe series” below ↓ in left-hand column.) i don’t yet know enough about the mating patterns of latin america or ethiopia.

– the authoritarian family, which is a type of stem family (nuclear family+grandparents), found in germany, austria, sweden, norway, belgium, bohemia, scotland, ireland, peripheral regions of france, northern spain, northern portugal, japan, korea, jews, and romany gypsies. todd notes that there is little or no marriage between the children of brothers in these populations, but again, most of the european countries/regions included here have avoided ALL cousin marriage for centuries. HOWEVER, they were mostly part a LATER — sometimes much later (e.g. ireland, highland scotland) — wave in The Outbreeding Project, just like the european egalitarian nuclear families above (for more details see “mating patterns in europe series” below ↓ in left-hand column). the japanese, too, began outbreeding quite latevery late, i believe (but i need to find out more). i don’t know enough about the koreans or jews (i assume todd means ashkenazi jews?) to say. in general, gypsies inbreed (marry their cousins) A LOT. so, as the extent of long-term inbreeding increases, the family size begins to increase.

– the exogamous community family found in russia, yugoslavia, slovakia, bulgaria, hungary, finland, albania, central italy, china, vietnam, cuba, and north india. todd notes that there is no marriage between the children of brothers in these groups, but in most of the eastern europeans populations here (not sure about finland or hungary), The Outbreeding Project arrived much later than in northwestern europe, and marriage between maternal cousins was not unusual in the medieval period (see “mating patterns in europe series” below ↓ in left-hand column). in some of these groups — like the albanians — maternal cousin marriage is probably still common today, or was until very recently. parts of italy, too, especially the farther south you go. maternal cousin marriage was common in china, especially in the south, for millennia (see “mating patterns in asia series” below ↓ in left-hand column). i don’t know enough about the vietnamese or cubans to say. the northern indians (the hindus) tend to avoid cousin marriage, but marry within castes, of course. so we see again that, the longer the history of cousin marriage, the larger the family size. most of these groups have been marrying cousins for several hundreds of years longer than northwestern europeans, and they have large “community” families.

– the endogamous community family found in the arab world, turkey, iran, afghanistan, pakistan, azerbaijan, turkmenistan, uzbekistan, and tajikistan. todd notes that there is frequent marriage between the children of brothers. that is absolutely correct — father’s brother’s daughter (fbd) marriage, which probably originated in the levant, was exported into the arabian peninsula, and spread out from there when the arabs conquered the middle east, north african, and many of the “-stans.” and it just so happens that fbd marriage leads to the greatest degrees of inbreeding possible — and, therefore, these populations have some of the largest family sizes possible (clans and tribes).

– the asymmetrical community family found in southern india. todd notes that maternal cousin marriage is preferred here, and the rates of cousin marriage in southern india — and uncle-niece marriage — are very high. so again, lots of close marriages leads to large, community families.

– the anomic family found in burma, cambodia, laos, thailand, malaysia, indonesia, philippines, madagascar, and south-american indian cultures. todd says that consanguineous marriages are permitted and “sometimes frequent” in these populations — and that adult children often live with their parents (so these families are larger than nuclear families). i don’t know much about the mating patterns in any of these groups, but if consanguineous marriages are frequent in them, it’s not surprising to find large family sizes.

african family systems found in sub-saharan africa. todd describes them as unstable and polygynous. i know that cousin marriage is common in some but not in others, but i don’t know many details. we shall have to wait and see on sub-saharan africa.

but hbd chick — maybe populations with large family sizes simply favor close marriages? perhaps it’s all just a coincidence!

no, it’s definitely NOT a coincidence, and we can know that the causal direction is from long-term mating patterns to family size (and various ideologies), because we have the example of europe to show us that.

BEFORE northwest europeans started outbreeding (avoiding cousin marriage) on a regular basis — in the pre-christian era — they had large families — kindreds and clans and tribes (for more details see “general” section and “mating patterns in europe series” below ↓ in left-hand column). and the groups that have been OUTBREEDING THE LONGEST — the english and the dutch (and the danes?) — have the smallest family sizes — and are the most individualistic. and the groups that started outbreeding later — for example the irish and the highland scots — they had larger families and even clans until well into the medieval period. same for eastern europe. and in the balkans, many of those groups are still marrying cousins today (or up until very recently), and they still have extended families and clans.

it’s not clear exactly what the mechanism is, but it must be biological and is, no doubt, related to the concept of inclusive fitness. the natural analogy (heh – see what i did there?) to draw would be to ants and the other eusocial insects (although i know many myrmecologists/entymologists don’t like to connect eusociality and inclusive fitness) — many of the individuals in these insect populations are very closely related, and, so (probably), they come together in very large family groups. other parallels might be to naked mole rats versus other mole rats or to meerkats, but i don’t know the mating patterns/genetic relatedness in those species.

however it actually works, the general pattern is clear: the closer the long-term mating patterns, the larger the family size (and the more family-oriented the populace) — the more distant the long-term mating patterns, the smaller the family size (and the more individualistic the populace — and, yet, more commonweal oriented — at least in europe…).

see also: craig willy’s Emmanuel Todd’s L’invention de l’Europe: A critical summary

previously: “l’explication de l’idéologie” and where do clans come from? and whatever happened to european tribes?

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the transition from shame to guilt in anglo-saxon england (and “core” europe)

peter frost has a really, really cool post up about how some societies are “shame cultures” while others are “guilt cultures” (i’ll let you guess which ones are which (~_^) ): The origins of Northwest European guilt culture.

this post is mostly going to be a response to — or a riff off — peter’s post, so, if you haven’t already, you might want to head over to his blog and read his post first. i’ll wait here.

oh! back already? ok! let’s get started…

peter says:

Shame is the primary means of behavioral control in most societies. If you are seen breaking a social rule, you will feel shame, and this feeling will be reinforced by what people say and do (gossiping, malicious looks, spitting, ostracism, etc.). Shame is much less effective if you break a rule without being seen or if you merely think about breaking a rule.

Guilt is more important in European societies, particularly those of Northwest European origin. It operates even when you act alone or merely think about breaking a rule. Behavior can thus be regulated in all possible situations with a minimum of surveillance.”

i haven’t read anything about shame vs. guilt cultures, so i don’t know if this division is correct or not (it certainly feels right), but let’s assume — just for now (i WILL investigate this further, because i think it might be a key point wrt any General Theory of the West) — that this is right and that northwest europeans (my “core” europeans) feel guilt more than most other peoples.

peter suggests that this guilt tripping of nw europeans goes right back to early anglo-saxon england and maybe even to pre-christian, pre-invasion continental germanic societies. he offers a couple of examples from anglo-saxon literature/christian writings: a passage from Beowulf and religious writings from the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries.

peter thinks that the passage from Beowulf might indicate that feelings of guilt versus shame go right back to pre-christian anglo-saxon (germanic) days. i’m a big fan of Beowulf, but its date is disputed — could be from anywhere from the eighth to the eleventh centuries — and parts of it could be earlier or much later than other parts. so it’s difficult to use Beowulf as an indicator of what was going on in the minds of anglo-saxons of any given period. i’m going to call it unreliable and stick to the christian writings which can be much more securely dated.

from peter’s post:

In Anglo-Saxon England, guilt already existed as a major means of behavioral control. The English abbot Aelfric of Eynsham (955-1010) described it as a special kind of shame where the witnesses to the wrongful act are divine entities or spirits of the dead:

“‘He who cannot because of shame confess his faults to one man, then it must shame him before the heaven-dwellers and the earth-dwellers and the hell-dwellers, and the shame for him will be endless. (Bedingfield, 2002, p. 80)’

“This argument comes up repeatedly in Anglo-Saxon literature, where it forms a ‘penitential motif’:

“‘The motif runs: it is better to be shamed for one’s sins before one man (the confessor) in this life than to be shamed before God and before all angels and before all men and before all devils at the Last Judgement. (Godden, 1973)’

Guilt thus played a major role in English culture at least as far back as Anglo-Saxon times. Furthermore, it seems to have been indigenous:

“‘One particularly interesting fact that emerges is the peculiarly Anglo-Saxon character of the motif. Not only did it circulate widely in Old English writings but the only two Latin works in which I have been able to find it were written by Anglo-Saxons — Alcuin and Boniface. Moreover an important element of the motif, the notion of three hosts present at the Last Judgement, is itself characteristic of Anglo-Saxon writers: the usual representation of the Last Judgement in continental works (as in Alcuin’s letter) has the angels and all mankind present, and sometimes the devil as prosecutor, but not the whole host of devils, whereas the concept of the three hosts, as in Boniface’s homily, is very common in Old English writings generally. (Godden, 1973)'”

to me it sounds as though these early christian anglo-saxon writers — boniface (d.754), alcuin (d.804), and aelfric of eynsham (d.1010) — were NOT writing about guilt, but rather about shame — albeit a rather special form of shame where, as peter said, the witnesses who would shame you were not living members of your society but “divine entities or spirits of the dead”. kind-of like how santa keeps a list of who’s been naughty and who’s been nice even though he spends most of the year up at the north pole. (how does he do it?!) somebody’s watching, so you’d better behave!

afaics, that’s still not guilt — i.e. when individuals check their own behavior simply because they’d feel bad if they did something wrong. this early anglo-saxon shame-guilt thing sounds like the beginnings of a transitional phase moving from a shame culture to a guilt culture. and this transitional phase seems to have been underway already in boniface’s day or the eighth century.

early anglo-saxon england was full of transitions. one big one that i’ve written about previously (see here and here) was the disappearance of the kindred which likely began in the early 900s (or possibly the late 800s). the overall trajectory of anglo-saxon society during the early medieval period seems to have been that of a move away from a more local-group-oriented sort-of society based upon kindreds towards a more individualistic society based upon the nuclear family. something similar seems to have been happening across the channel in the low countries (and, probably, northeastern france and northwestern germany — and kinda-sorta in parts of northern italy).

the amazing thing about these societies that became more individualistic is that they — seemingly paradoxically — became the very same societies in which collective behaviors work the best! BROADLY collective — like on a society-wide basis. strong majorities in “core” europe are oriented towards the commonweal in ways that many, if not most, other societies are not (there are exceptions — and there are no doubt more).

so northwest (my “core”) europeans can have these (so can the japanese!)…

vegetable stand - honor system

…or these…

newspaper vending machine

because most people in society would feel guilty — internally, all on their own — if they stole from somebody else.

i suspect that guilt does not go back to pre-christian germanic societies. if they had’ve had guilt proper, then the early christian anglo-saxon clerics wouldn’t have written these weird quasi-shame/quasi-guilt lessons for the people. they would’ve just talked about guilt and everyone would’ve understood it in an “of course” sort-of way.

feelings of guilt were probably selected for over the course of the middle ages in northwestern europe starting in the early part of the period. i would wager good money on it! (^_^) and it was thanks to The Outbreeding Project (imho) — to quote myself:

“think of it like a two-stage rocket:

“- FIRST you have either inbreeding or outbreeding (or any range in between those), and these mating patterns either focus or disperse ‘genes for altruism’ … within extended family groups, which …

“- THEN sets the stage for creating different selection pressures in that different social environments are created (egs. nuclear families, extended families, clans, larger tribes). it’s HERE in this second stage where the behaviors — either clannish or not (or any range in between those!) — are selected for (or can be selected for).

including guilt. i betcha!

look forward to part ii of peter’s post on this question. stay tuned!

(note: comments do not require an email. santa and friends! (~_^) )

mating patterns in france and topography (and history)

continuing on in the quest to find out the connection, if any, between inbreeding/outbreeding and topography (flatlanders vs. mountaineers), here is a map of the coefficients of inbreeding in france between 1926-1945 (based upon roman catholic cousin marriage rates) — the darker the shading, the greater the inbreeding…

france - coefficients of inbreeding (1926-1945)

…and here is a topographical map of france via wikipedia

france - map - topography

to me, it looks like the higher the elevation/more rugged the area, the greater the amount of inbreeding.

there’s also the history of the franks to take into consideration. as i’ve said previously, the franks in austrasia seem to have been the earliest population in europe to join in The Outbreeding Project of the church/tptb. and the regions of france with the lowest rates of inbreeding appear to be those that were once a part of austrasia — the earliest frankish kingdom — and those in neustria to the southwest, an area conquered by the franks in 486. swabia, too. also from wikipedia:


that is all! (^_^)

previously: this one’s for g.w. and flatlanders vs. mountaineers revisited and meanwhile, in france… and going dutch and the auvergnat pashtuns

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trust in the u.s. by generation

t.greer, in discussing the relationship between trust and diversity in the u.s. and putnam’s Bowling Alone and E Pluribus Unum [pdf], said in a comment yesterday:

“As Putnam notes there, most of the change we are talking about here is generational – that is to say, the problem is not that people became less trusting over time, but that the next generation down the line does not inherit the trust of their parents. The ‘greatest generation’s’ ability to trust did not decrease as the number of immigrants increased, or as America desegregated, or anything like that. They went to their graves with about as much as trust and social solidarity as they had back in the 40s.”

i thought i’d check that, so i dove into the gss today. here’s what i found when i looked by generation (i used the dates for generations on wikipedia) at who replied that people CAN be trusted [TRUST] for the years 1972, 1980, 1990, and 2000 [click on chart for LARGER view]:

gss - people can be trusted - by generation

so, while it appears to be true that both the baby boomers and generation x did start off with much less trust in their fellow humans than either the greatest generation or the silent generation, the members of both the greatest and silent generations have, indeed, lost a good deal of faith in their fellow americans. the greatest generation’s trust doesn’t seem to have dropped until round about 2000 when they would’ve been aged 76+, but the silent generation went all cyncial by 1990 when they were between ages 26 and 44 45 and 65 (oops! sorry).

trust is in decline in america, and it’s NOT just a generational thing. and the first dip that we can pick up here in the gss happened sometime in the ’90s.

gss parameters used: TRUST, YEAR, and AGE OF RESPONDENT

Generation X – 1990 – n=109
Generation X – 2000 – n=552
Baby Boomers – 1972 – n=283
Baby Boomers – 1980 – n=543
Baby Boomers – 1990 – n=400
Baby Boomers – 2000 – n=754
Silent Generation – 1972 – n=609
Silent Generation – 1980 – n=458
Silent Generation – 1990 – n=221
Silent Generation – 2000 – n=399
Greatest Generation – 1972 – n=571
Greatest Generation – 1980 – n=410
Greatest Generation – 1990 – n=168
Greatest Generation – 2000 – n=129
Lost Generation – 1972 – n=129
Lost Generation – 1980 – n-41

previously: putnam’s paradise and “the community-diversity dialectic” and the “happiest, healthiest” community in the u.s. and on being trusting

(note: comments do not require an email. oh, hai!)