behind the hajnal line

**update below**

here’s a map created by jayman of average european iqs (taken from here), and on top of it i’ve added the hajnal line:

the populations behind the hajnal line (i.e. the core of europe) are characterized by:

late marriages (present since at least the early medieval period)
small family sizes (nuclear or stem families versus extended families; also present since at least the early medieval period)
– higher average iqs, in general, than populations in the periphery of europe (see map)
strong future time orientation, strong societal collectivism, strong preference for rules and order (Ordnung!), strong drive to succeed
– being more civic than populations in the periphery of europe

why?

well, maybe it’s just ’cause these populations are mostly germanic, or at least had a strong-ish germanic presence in their territory at some time in the past. maybe this is just an example of ice peoples who evolved high iqs and a lot of other neat traits ’cause they survived for a long time in adverse conditions.

but’s it’s hard to ignore how the Type A Personality areas of europe coincide with the hajnal line. at least, i find it hard to ignore. what happened behind the hajnal line?

at the risk of repeating myself (is there an echo in here?), what happened behind the hajnal line starting in the early medieval period was:

– changes in mating patterns (thanks to the church) from close relative marriage to more distant marriages, thus breaking down clans and tribes
– changes in the economic structure from whatever the h*ll went before (i have no idea) to manorialism
– changes in family structures (thanks to both the increased outbreeding and manorialism) from extended families to smaller nuclear or stem families

all of these would’ve changed the selection pressures on the populations in the areas where these practices were adopted.

inbreeding and outbreeding probably select differently for genes related to altruism, so all of the outbreeding behind the hajnal line likely selected for different sorts of altruistic behaviors than those seen in other populations — strong societial collectivistic feelings, for instance. (perhaps it looks something like this.) the changes in family structures likely also selected for different traits — for one thing, different family types have different family dynamics and some personality types likely do better in some types of families than in others.

but what’s manorialism got to do with it? like i said here

“you have this manor system in which the lord (or monks) of the manor let out land to farmers to run (they then owed the manor service or rent). the lord of the manor specifically let out land to married couples, ’cause it took two to run a small farm properly, i.e. to carry out all the necessary duties…. so who is a young and upcoming, hard-working, driven farmer going to seek out to marry? well, maybe he just marries the prettiest girl he can find — but maybe, if he’s smart, he marries someone like himself who is also hard-working and driven and wants to run a successful manor holding. they might even be attracted to one another. maybe it was exactly those sorts of couples — the smart, hard-working, industrious couples — who were the most successful and left the most descendants behind.

…so maybe manorialism contributed to higher average iqs and traits like “strong drive to succeed.”

where did manorialism occur? it started with the franks as early as the seventh century in their territory between the seine and the rhine. it was a characteristic feature of the carolingian empire and was pretty much present throughout carolingian territories.

it was introduced to northern, but not southern, italy by the carolingians. southern italy was part of the byzantine empire so manorialism wasn’t introduced there in the early medieval period, nor was it adpoted there later in the middle ages. manorialsm never took hold in greece or the balkans.

manorialism was present in england by the eighth century, but not scotland or ireland or wales. the normans brought it to ireland in the eleventh century, but its adoption was patchy at best. southern spain did not experience manorialism due to moorish rule, but parts of northern spain did.

manorialism spread eastwards during the ostsiedlung and was really the fundamental economic structure of the german settlements to the east. the system was also introduced, as late as the sixteenth century, to eastern regions of europe like poland and belarus. the eastern edge of the hajnal line — where the western and eastern churches meet — represents the limits of the manor system in europe.

the populations behind the hajnal line have a unique history (well, all populations do!) and, i think, were very much shaped in a human biodiversity sort-of way during the medieval period. there were strong selection pressures precisely in areas related to mating and reproduction that really profoundly changed northwestern/central europeans and laid the foundations for all sorts of interesting things that happened in europe. it may have also laid the foundations for our demise, but hey — you can’t have everything.

none of the populations in the periphery in europe experienced this collection of changes. they may have experienced some of the changes — like the ban on cousin marriage out to second cousins in greece and eastern europe — but because they didn’t have the manor system, they did not develop nuclear families or highly mobile individuals like the core of europe. and some populations, like the southern italians and the irish, in addition to not adopting the manor system, also just kept right on inbreeding up until very recently.

here are some excerpts from michael mitterauer’s “Why Europe?: The Medieval Origins of Its Special Path” from which i learned everything i know about manorialism [pgs. 53-57]:

“These cross-cultural examples of analogous, and markedly contrasting, agricultural systems illustrate the uniqueness of the manorial and the hide systems as they developed as components of the early medieval agrarian revolution in the Frankish heartland. The diffusion of innovations from the agrarian economy and the agrarian system very often took place in concert — as, for instance, during the great process of the colonization of the East. This was not true in every case, of course. The manorial system expanded southward, following the Frankish Empire’s specific forms of lordship and penetrating into regions where typical features of the Frankish agrarian revolution did not exist. A large, relatively homogenous area was created by these expansionist movements, which were characterized on the whole by identical or similar structures of the agrarian system and the social order it generated. Over against this ‘core Europe’ was a ‘peripheral Europe’ that did not acquire these structures until a relatively later date — or not at all. Here we can list Ireland, Wales, and Scotland in the West; the area of eastern Europe beyond the Trieste-St. Petersburg line that was unaffected by the colonization of the East; the entire Balkan region; southern Italy, which was formerly Byzantine, along with the southern part of the Iberian Peninsula that was under Moorish rule for so long a time. The political, economic, and social evolution of many regions in ‘peripheral Europe’ took a different turn because of their clinging to other, traditional agrarian systems.

“As Frankish models of the manorial system advanced through various parts of Europe, they met with quite diverse forms of social organization. In the North and East it was mainly tribal societies that were transformed by the new structures of the agrarian reovlution. They could be organized in very different ways, as was evident in medieval Europe. When Germanic tribes settled on Roman imperial land — the Franks, Burgundii, Alemanni, and Bavarii among them — categories of descent as a basis for social order played a role, a role very different from the one it played in the thinking of Celtic tribes in Ireland or of Finnish and Baltic tribes around the Baltic Sea. Consequently, the resistance of the various tribes to manorial structures was highly differentiated from region to region. In many places these structures rapidly superseded more ancient types of tribal organization; in many others, not at all. We can say that the manorial system and the tribal system were basically incompatible at the social level of the peasantry. The economic rationale for an agriculture based on manorialism cannot be harmonized with dominant organizing principles based on kinship. That proved to be the case throughout Europe wherever the social organization of the manorial and hide system supplanted tribal structures. In many non-European empires, the lack of such organizations might well have contributed to the local preservation of social forms based on descent in spite of strong influence of a central state — for instance, in China and the Islamic world….

“The manorial system of the Carolingian Empire was premised on the personal relationship of the lord with his familia [all of the people who lived and worked on the manor, most of whom were not related to one another]. This principle continued to have a more or less potent effect on every form of the manorial system that grew out of it. Any and all lordship in this tradition was lordship over a group of people organized ‘as a family….’

“Manorialism and the hide system were just as significant for European social history on the macro level of organized lordship as they were on the micro level of household organization. Claude Levi-Strauss has coined the term societe a maison, which fits these developments in European society like a glove. Households seem to have been a central ordering principle in this case. In a peasant society, at any rate, the primary social orientation was to one’s house, not to one’s relatives. This was an essential distinguishing feature vis-a-vis societies oriented toward descent; these kinship patterns were located around the periphery of Europe, but in the main they lay beyond Europe’s borders. Belonging to a household was clearly a basic building block of the bipartite estate in the Frankish Empire. On the one hand, there was the villa, the lord’s manor, or the steward’s manor, with its resident labor force, the members of which were not tied to one another by kinship; on the other hand, there were the farms of the servi casati, that is, of the unfree laborers and their dwellings, as well as the coloni who were boind to the soil and therefore to a house. Together they formed the familia, an overarching household embracing several households…. Affiliation with a farmstead of this kind was socially determinative, not the affiliation to a group through kinship.

update: see also jayman’s IQ Ceilings?

previously: medieval manoralism and genetic relatedness and family types and the evolution of behavioral traits and assortative mating and the selection for high iq in (some) medieval european populations?

(note: comments do not require an email. snow!)

assortative mating and the selection for high iq in (some) medieval european populations?

here’s a thought…

henry harpending has an interesting post up about how assortative mating amongst high- vs. low-iq individuals within a population could pretty quickly (in four generations) lead to different castes having high or low average iqs. he even drew up a couple of nice diagrams to illustrate his model, like this one:

what if … the new mating patterns in certain parts of medieval europe (strong outbreeding) PLUS the new socio-economic structure in certain parts of medieval europe (manorialism) led to increased assortative mating according to average iq in medieval europe?

what i’m envisioning is … the church banned cousin marriage, so you no longer automatically married one of your cousins — you had to go find a spouse somewhere. and, in fact, the medieval church strongly encouraged that marriage should be a choice made by the two individuals involved, not between parents or families or whomever.

on top of that, you have this manor system in which the lord (or monks) of the manor let out land to farmers to run (they then owed the manor service or rent). the lord of the manor specifically let out land to married couples, ’cause it took two to run a small farm properly, i.e. to carry out all the necessary duties. the nuclear family was it on medieval manors.

so who is a young and upcoming, hard-working, driven farmer going to seek out to marry? well, maybe he just marries the prettiest girl he can find — but maybe, if he’s smart, he marries someone like himself who is also hard-working and driven and wants to run a successful manor holding. they might even be attracted to one another. maybe it was exactly those sorts of couples — the smart, hard-working, industrious couples — who were the most successful and left the most descendants behind. maybe the combined outbreeding + manorialism environment helped to select for a population with a rather high average iq (’cause in the medieval period, the low iq folks would’ve mostly been weeded out).

contrast the medieval european world with almost any tribal or extended-family world where chances are you just marry your cousin or a fellow clan member and live in a compound with almost all of your relatives. how hard of an environment is that in which to survive or be a success? you’d think that lifestyle would actually carry dullards along rather easily — and the dullards might even be married off to their dull cousins and make even more dullards. most importantly, there’s no assortative mating across the whole population to strongly select for a higher average iq.

which populations in medieval europe had this combination of outbreeding + manorialism? england, france, germany, the low countries, northern spain, northern italy and, later, areas to the east like poland.

sound familiar?

edit: should’ve thrown other traits in there as well along with higher iq — industriousness, conscientiousness, all that stuff.

previously: whatever happened to european tribes? and medieval manoralism and genetic relatedness and “l’explication de l’idéologie” and family types and the evolution of behavioral traits and the middle ages

(note: comments do not require an email. medieval home sweet home.)

pathological altruism

here’s another book i haven’t read: Pathological Altrusim edited by barbara oakley and a bunch of other people.

i did read this article [opens pdf] from new scientist written by oakley and madhavan. in it, the authors say:

“Over the past decade, there has been an explosion in research and interest in the positive aspects of altruism. Several disciplines, in particular neuroscience and genetics, are providing useful new insights. Against this background, even to hint that altruism could have a dark shadow seems sacrilegious to many. What if it causes people to stop trying to help others?

“This should not deter us from exploring the issue, given the harm it [pathological altrusim] can cause if left unchallenged. For example, during the Rwandan genocide in 1994, many Hutus killed Tutsis because they thought that in doing so they would help protect their fellow Hutus. In other words, they believed they were benefiting their society, their culture and those most dear to them. And there are many other examples of harmful behaviours that occur within the context of helping those close to us, or our in-group….”

hmmm.

of course genocide is a terrible thing. it is obviously terrible for those people killed; it is terrible for a good number of those who witness such a thing, even via a history lesson; and it is probably terrible for some or even many of the people doing the killing. so, no, i do not condone genocide.

however, many hutus “thought” they would be helping their fellow hutus by getting rid of a lot of tutsis? how about they probably did benefit their fellow hutus — or it’s likely that they did anyway.

rwanda is/was a very crowded place. in any environment where a group of creatures has to share resources with another group of creatures — even if they are partly related — that first group will clearly benefit if they can get rid of the second (more resources for them!). ideally they’d want to get rid of the competition with no repercussions to their own group. i don’t think the hutus really managed that — i.e. i’m sure there are a lot of tutsis around who are holding a grudge.

but it’s just plain silly to think that any genocidal group just “believes” that they’re benfitting their group. if they can get away with it, they probably ARE!

happy thoughts for a friday afternoon, i know. sorry.

previously: gene-o-cide

(note: comments do not require an email. here’s something more cheerful! maybe. (~_^) )

family types and the evolution of behavioral traits

m.g. and jayman (and maybe some others of you out there?) have been saying for a while now that they think that family types/structures are very important when thinking about the structures/functioning of different societies (see also both of their blogs here and here) — and i’ve been hearing them, but maybe not listening very closely. (once my little aspergian, ocd brain starts following a line of thought — e.g. mating patterns and the structures/functioning of different societies — it can be difficult to re-focus. (~_^) )

anyway, i’m sure that they — and emmanuel todd (and others) — ARE on to something very important!

i said before that i was sure that todd was on to something, but i didn’t buy his explanations which are sorta a cross between sociology and freudianism. i mean: meh. i complained in this post here:

“i haven’t finished ‘The Explanation of Ideology’ yet, but so far todd has described some very interesting patterns in relationships between family types and political ideologies. he’s definitely on to something here; but his work, to my mind, is ‘only’ descriptive (i put ‘only’ in quotes because i don’t mean to belittle his work in any way — it’s an enormous contribution to understanding ideologies, i think!). but, he doesn’t really get down to why family structures and kinship should affect ideologies in the ways that they appear to do. what he’s missing, i think, are some biological concepts like inclusive fitness and all the sorts of behaviors that follow from that.

even though todd’s work, to me, seemed to be “only” descriptive, it is still a powerful description. his connections between family types and national or societal ideologies seem to be very right on. for instance, here’s his “exogamous community family” type and communistic societies (think slavs):

exogamous community family
– cohabitation of married sons and their parents
– equality between brothers defined by rules of inheritance
– no marriage between the children of two brothers
– russia, yugoslavia, slovakia, bulgaria, hungary, finland, albania, central italy, china, vietnam, cuba, north india (note that many of these countries, the eastern european ones, also have a tradition of marrying young)
– communism, edit 01/08/12: socialism

what bothered me about todd’s explanations (or lack of them, afaiac) was that they didn’t take biology into account. but what just dawned on me in the last couple of days (took so long ’cause of my aspergian, ocd brain!) is that the biological explanation he’s missing is evolution by natural selection! eureka! (or, duh! *facepalm* basic principles, hbd chick. basic principles.)

it was something jayman said the other day that made it click in my (dense little) brain:

“The key factor is communal vs nuclear families, it seems. As you and others had discussed, nuclear families promote individuality since one often had to stand and succeed on one’s own, rather than depending on the family for support and guidance (probably also very important for men seeking mates as well).

“But in communal societies, individuality was not so important. Indeed, it may have been a detriment, as this may have made living in the communal home difficult. Perhaps Eastern peoples are so accepting of authority because most spent much or all of their adult lives under the yoke of the patriarch, and this may have selected for different traits than in the west.”

of course! yes, yes, yes! family types (like mating patterns) have placed selection pressures on populations. (thnx, jayman!)

in any particular society, whatever personality or emotional or even intelligence traits that enabled the individuals living in a certain family type to leave the most descendants behind would become most common in that population.

thus, like m.g. says:

“I’ve often wondered why Communism was able to latch on and survive for so long in the Slavic lands. Perhaps it has more to do with their very old, peculiar system of dividing property–communally, not individually.”

yes. for whatever quirky historical reasons (i.e. circumstances), those slavs who succeeded reproductively were those that lived in extended family-groups headed by a male patriarch. after living like this for pretty much thousands of years (the russians apparently took a bit of a break for a few hundred years during the medieval period), you’d think that personality traits that would lead to the acceptance of the redistribution of food and goods amongst the members of the communal group — and even those traits leading to the acceptance of following a single, strong male leader in an almost unquestioning manner — would’ve been selected for.

todd says [pgs. 33 & 39]:

“According to the handbooks of the Third International, communism is the dictatorship of the proletariat. But I would like to suggest another definition which seems to correspond more closely to the sociological and geographic reality of the phenomenon: communism is a transference to the party state of the moral traits and the regulatory mechanisms of the exogamous community family. Sapped by urbanization, industrialization and the spread of literacy, in short by modernization, the exogamous community family passes on its egalitarian and authoritarian values to the new society. Individuals with equal rights are crushed by the political system in the same way they were destroyed in the past by the extended family when it was the dominant institution of traditional Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese or Serbian society….

“The creation of a communist structure allows individuals to be reintegrated into a family setting which is authoritarian and egalitarian. The party replaces the family. Its cells artificially reproduce relationships of fraternity which are dense and intolerable. Even deadly. Its hierarchy replaces paternal authority literally on every level. At the base, the secretary of the cell intervenes in the family life of Soviet couples. At the top, the father follow one after the other: a dynamic, talkative and violent father in Lenin; a sadistic father in Stalin; and aged father in Brezhnev, who carried the metaphor of the Russian political family to its limit.”

lemme re-write those two sentences i highlighted:

– communism is a transference to the party state of the innate moral traits and the biologically-based regulatory mechanisms within populations which had been selected for after generations of living within the exogamous community family.
– the exogamous community family passes on its egalitarian and authoritarian values, which are innate behavioral traits of its members that have been selected for after generations of living within this family type, to the new society.

there. that’s better! (^_^)

previously: “l’explication de l’idéologie” and mating patterns in medieval eastern europe

(note: comments do not require an email. great moments in evolution!)

the other famiglia

“Inside the World of the ‘Ndrangheta”
“01/04/2012
“By Andreas Ulrich

“Encounters with the Calabrian Mafia

“The shadowy Calabrian mafia, the ‘Ndrangheta, has become one of the most powerful criminal organizations in the Western world through its dominance of the European cocaine trade. For the first time, local syndicate bosses described their business model to SPIEGEL. It’s a mixture of entrepreneurial talent, skillful management and deadly ruthlessness….

“‘My German is better than my Italian,’ admits Carlo, who has been living in Germany for 30 years. He is wearing a black shirt, black trousers and black loafers — elegant Italian products, all made of high-quality materials. He was baptized at 18, he says.

“He is referring to the secret ritual in which he was accepted into the ‘onorata società,’ or ‘honored society,’ as the ‘Ndrangheta calls itself. His uncle brought him into the organization. This is often the case in such organizations, where cohesion is based on kinship and there are few traitors as a result….

“In its early days, the organization was little more than a loose collection of rural clans. Their activities centered around controlling their villages, protection money, hold-ups and public contracts….

“The experts with Germany’s BKA have studied the current structure of the ‘Ndrangheta. According to the BKA report, the syndicate is “no longer structured horizontally in individual family clans, but, like the Cosa Nostra, in the form of a pyramid.” In the province of Reggio Calabria, for example, the ‘Ndrangheta has divided itself into three so-called mandamenti. A ‘provincial commission,’ which rules over the entire organization, elects a ‘capo crimine,’ or chairman, each year….

“Although the ‘Ndrangheta operates worldwide, all important decisions are made in Calabria. In an era of globalization, the drug trade remains relatively anachronistic. Cocaine from South America arrives in southern Italy before it is distributed across the European continent. The clans feel safe on their home turf, which they treat as their territory….

“The Piromalli-Molé are among the most powerful ‘Ndrangheta clans in the region around Gioia Tauro. They are wholesalers in the international cocaine business. They have family connections in South America, and they have their agents in Germany, including people like Carlo….

To this day, strategic alliances are formed between families in the ‘Ndrangheta through marriage….

“”Gratteri is the anti-mafia prosecutor in Reggio Calabria. The prosecutor believes that the weakness of the state is also the strength of the ‘Ndrangheta. The mob bosses provide jobs, help people sort out problems with the government bureaucracy and recruit their young blood from the army of the unemployed and the hopeless. Gratteri also has no illusions about the police, which he says is already infiltrated by the ‘Ndrangheta, because of close family ties.

previously: la famiglia

(note: comments do not require an email. fuggedaboutit!)

jewish mating patterns in nineteenth century russia

while looking around for books about mating patterns in eastern europe, i came across this very interesting book: Jewish Marriage and Divorce in Imperial Russia.

according to the author, there are, unfortunately, not a whole h*ck of a lot of surviving records related to births/deaths/marriages of russian jews from this era — most were destroyed during wwii. d*mn. however, she did find nearly complete records from a town called korostyshev in the ukraine (pale of settlement).

in 1847, there were 2,657 people (jews — it was a shtetl) living in korostyshev and they pretty much all married locally. now not all those 2,657 people would’ve been of reproductive age — there’d have been children and old folks in there, too. so, i dunno, let’s guess that around a quarter of them were of reproductive age (i don’t know if that’s right — i’m just guessing — take this with a grain of salt). that’s only ca. 664 people mating — 332 couples. that’s a pretty small group, i.e. it would’ve inevitably been pretty inbred.

and the author points out that cousin marriage was reportedly common amongst jewish in nineteenth century russia — and that certain networks of families inbred with each other over and over again. (this is reminiscent of well-to-do families in medieval european cities.)

i don’t know for how long these close mating patterns were practised amongst russian jews. obviously, as a separate ethnic group, ashkenazi jews mostly traditionally bred within their own group. but for how long did they marry cousins/within small family networks/mostly within the shtetl? from the beginning of the pale of settlement? earlier than that? i don’t know. what i do know — what i have learned over these past few months of reading about mating patterns — is that the patterns can change. peoples will alter their mating patterns as their circumstances change, so you can’t assume anything.

russian jews definitely married very closely during the nineteenth century. my guess is that they did so earlier as well, but that’s just a guess.

given the fact that ashkenazi jews in russia (and elsewhere in europe?) bred so closely for probably many generations, it’s not strange that geneticists have found that ashkenazi (and other populations, like sephardic) jews are related to one another within their respective sub-populations, on average, as though they were all fourth or fifth cousins.

here are some excerpts from Jewish Marriage and Divorce in Imperial Russia [pgs. 25-27]:

“Yikus (Family Lineage)

“‘As is well known, Jews are excessively picayune about good lineage,’ wrote a commentator in ‘Evreikoe obozrenie,’ and thus ‘yikus plays an extremely important role in marital matters.’ One need only peruse the genealogical histories of famous Hasidic dynasties or rabbinical families to ascertain the importance of lineage in marital unions. Despite the adage that ‘a shoemaker’s son does not marry a rabbi’s daughter,’ it was possible, if rare, for someone of modest descent to marry into a distinguished family….

“The emerging class of Jewish entrepreneurs, intent on gaining elite respectability, place a high premium on family status in choosing partners. According to Aleksandr Poliakov, his grandfather’s cousins — the illustrious bankers and railroad financiers Iakov, Samuel, and Lazar Poliakov — married off their daughters to ‘different dynasties of European bankers, as well as French and German aristocrats.’ Bound by commercial as well as cultural ties, upper-class Jews often met in salons or over intimate Sabbath dinners, where their children were introduced to one another. Aleksandr Poliakov’s own father met his wife, Flora Shabbat, the daughter of a prominent first-guild merchant, over a Sabbath meal in Moscow.

“No matter how distinguished the family lineage, it had to be ‘pure’ — that is, there was to be no suspicion that ‘he or she was the offspring of an illicit union’ or a convert from Judaism. One way to avoid a ‘tainted’ individual was to limit marriages to relatives or a close circle of known families. Judaism even encouraged cousin marriages, particularly during the Middle Ages, when relatives were given priority over strangers. These marriages were deemed advantageous not only because they strengthened common bonds but also because they provided an opportunity to combine assests and expand markets.

Although data on consanguineous marriages in Russia are lacking, contemporaries claimed that they were ‘very common,’ largely because of the narrow circle of eligible partners for any given class of Jews. This geographic endogamy impelled one Jewish observer to write that ‘the expression “Kol Yisrael ahim” or “all Jews are brothers” is true in this sense, that Jews [who] belong to one strata of society and reside in one area, always find out that they are related when discussing their family backgrounds.’ The strategy of marrying relatives was particularly pronounced in small towns. It was due to concerns about family lineage, as well as to restrictions on geographic mobility (i.e., legal restrictions on residency, poor communications and transportation, and the high costs for travel).

That observation indeed finds confirmation in the metrical records. These archival materials are unusually complete for Korostyshev, a small town in Kiev province with 2,657 Jewish residents in 1847. Unlike many Ukrainian towns where the metrical records were destroyed during World War II, Korostyshev preserved metrical books from the mid-nineteenth century to 1915, thus representing some of the most complete runs of Jewish metrical books in the entire Ukraine. Significantly, they reveal that most residents married locally — that is, to people from Korostyshev or, at most, from nearby villages and towns (Zhitomir, Berdichev, and Radomysl’). Still more striking were the marital bonds between small family networks — for example, the countless marriages among the Fuksmans, Gershengorens, Trakhtenbergs, and Ratners (all of whom lived in Korostyshev or nearby Zhitomir). Another network included the Vinikurs, Tsiponiuks, and Abrumovichs; this cluster overlapped with a group that included the Kagans, Umerskiis, and Peigers. And so on until, several decades later, many Korostyshev residents were distant or even close relatives. Devorah Baron’s description of small shtetl families was indeed perspicacious: ‘In our little town, families joined together by marriage ties often resembled well-fitted but separate sections of garment; all that was needed was the skillful hand that would join the seams.'”
_____

“Jews [who] belong to one strata of society and reside in one area, always find out that they are related when discussing their family backgrounds….” sounds like what happens to me whenever i travel back to the “old country.” (~_^)

previously: jewish inbreeding and jewish endogamy on mallorca and cousin marriage rates amongst nineteenth century english and english jews and inbreeding in nineteenth century alsace-lorraine (including jews)

(note: comments do not require an email. shtetl.)

brainwash

this is grrrrrreeeeeaaaaat (as tony the tiger would say)! at least this first episode is. (^_^)

i heard about this series before from steve sailer, and referenced it once in this post here, but now someone has apparently gone and added engrish subtitles to the series. yay! (can’t vouch for the quality of the translations.)

unfortunately, i can’t figure out how to embed the video here on wordpress (they’ve got iframe issues and i’m not about to start downloading plugins), but you can watch the video(s) here @mrctv.

here’s more about the series:

“What Eia [the host of the show] had done, was to first interview the Norwegian social scientists on issues like sexual orientation, gender roles, violence, education and race, which are heavily politicized in the Norwegian science community. Then he translated the interviews into English and took them to well-known British and American scientists like Robert Plomin, Steven Pinker, Anne Campbell, Simon Baron-Cohen, Richard Lippa, David Buss, and others, and got their comments. To say that the American and British scientists were surprised by what they heard, is an understatement.”

heh. (i almost feel sorry for the social scientists. almost….)

now why can’t somebody make a series like this in engrish?!

h/t to a commenter over @steve’s blog calling himself the observer for pointing to the videos. (^_^)

previously: the hard sciences are soooo sexist!

(note: comments do not require an email. brainwash!)